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and Employment in the 
Global Economy
This article is based on papers presented at a 
2013 conference titled “Measuring the Effects of 
Globalization.” These papers will be published in a 
forthcoming book, Measuring Globalization, edited 
by Susan Houseman and Michael Mandel, and 
published by the Upjohn Institute. Draft versions of 
these and other papers presented at the conference 
are available at http://www.upjohn.org/MEG/
Conference_agenda.
The globalization of the U.S. 
economy is evidenced by the rapid 
expansion of trade. In the 1960s, the 
volume of U.S. trade (imports plus 
exports) expressed as a percent of 
U.S. GDP was a mere 9 percent. That 
percentage has steadily expanded in 
the intervening years, and today trade 
is the equivalent of 30 percent of U.S. 
GDP. Large trade deficits and sharp 
declines in manufacturing employment 
accompanying the expansion of trade 
have fueled concerns about the loss 
of American competitiveness and the 
impacts of trade on U.S. workers. 
Yet import and export data 
traditionally used by policymakers 
and researchers to study the global 
competitiveness of domestic industries 
and the effects of trade on employment, 
among other things, can be misleading. 
The reason: the fragmentation of 
production and the growth of global 
supply chains. With the break-up of 
vertically integrated companies and 
the development of extensive global 
production networks, imports from one 
country increasingly embed intermediate 
inputs produced in other countries. By 
extension, exports from a country may 
contain significant content from imported 
intermediates. 
A session at the conference focused 
on efforts in the international statistical 
community to develop so-called trade in 
value-added measures. These measures 
are designed to provide a more accurate 
picture of what is made where and 
thereby allow a better understanding of 
trade flows and their economic impacts. 
In this article, I review some of this 
research, with a particular focus on 
insights that new trade in value-added 
data have for the competitiveness of U.S. 
industries and the employment trends 
in high-, medium-, and low-skilled 
occupations. 
Trade in Value Added 
The need for trade in value-added 
measures was popularized by case 
studies such as those of the Apple iPad 
and iPhone supply chains (Kraemer, 
Linden, and Dedrick 2011).  Although the 
U.S.-based company Apple designs and 
distributes these products, it outsources 
all production. Final assembly of iPads 
and iPhones occurs in China in plants 
owned by the Taiwanese-based company 
Foxconn, with parts produced in Japan, 
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Taiwan, South Korea, and Europe. 
Each iPad or iPhone imported into the 
United States adds between $200 and 
$300 to the U.S. bilateral trade deficit 
with China, yet Kraemer, Linden, and 
Dedrick estimate that only about $10 of 
the value, or about 4 percent, is captured 
by Chinese workers. As such case studies 
illustrate, bilateral trade deficits, which 
are measured by gross imports and 
exports, can be misleading in a world 
economy characterized by extensive 
global production chains.
At the conference, Timmer, Los, and 
de Vries (2013) presented work on the 
recently released World Input-Output 
Database (WIOD), a trade in value-added 
database sponsored by the European 
Community, while Ahmad (2013) 
reported on an initiative undertaken 
by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
to create a more comprehensive and 
ongoing trade in value-added database, 
building on the WIOD and earlier efforts 
by U.S. and Japanese agencies. These 
databases involve the construction 
of global input-output (I-O) tables, 
providing a full accounting of how goods 
and services produced in each country are 
utilized as inputs or to meet final demand 
domestically and in other countries. 
These data permit the estimation, for 
example, of the value-added contribution 
(i.e., the payments to labor and capital) 
from each sector in each country to meet 
the final demand for goods and services 
globally. The WIOD and OECD-WTO 
databases also include information on 
labor input by skill or education level, 
which allows the separate computation 
of capital and labor compensation and 
employment or hours input by labor type. 
In addition, data on carbon emissions 
enable estimates of the environmental 
impacts of global production and trade. 
While world I-O tables are 
conceptually straightforward, data gaps 
make their construction complex. One 
particular challenge is that countries 
generally do not collect information 
on the destination of imports in the 
economy, and so the assignment of 
imports to various industries in the I-O 
tables must be based on assumptions.1 
Insights from Trade in 
Value-Added Data
The WIO and OECD-WTO data 
provide a number of insights into 
evolving patterns of global production, 
trade, and employment. Reflecting the 
growth of global supply chains, trade in 
intermediate inputs has grown, and the 
import value of exports is significant in 
all advanced countries. In the United 
States, the import value of exported 
manufactured products was about 15 
percent in 2009.2 At the same time, 
countries have become more dependent 
on foreign demand as a source of growth 
for income from manufactured products. 
In 1995, a quarter of the value added 
by the United States to meet demand 
worldwide for manufactured products 
derived from foreign countries; by 
2008 that share had risen to a third. 
Similarly, foreign demand accounted for 
almost half of Chinese value added for 
manufactures in 2008, up from about a 
third in 1995 (Timmer, Los, and de Vries 
2013, Table 3). 
Value-added data also reveal the 
critical role of services in world trade. 
Services account for about two-thirds 
of GDP in most advanced economies, 
but less than a quarter of total trade, as 
measured by conventional import and 
export statistics. But these statistics 
do not factor in the value added by the 
services sector in traded manufactured 
products. When computed on a value-
added basis, services account for over 
half of the export value in most countries, 
including the United States (Ahmad 
2013, Figure 6). Similarly, about half of 
the jobs directly and indirectly needed to 
produce manufactured products currently 
are generated outside the manufacturing 
sector, with the share accounted for by 
services growing over time (Timmer, 
Los, and de Vries 2013). 
World I-O tables provide a useful tool 
for assessing the global competitiveness 
of a nation’s industries. As illustrated 
with the Apple iPad and iPhone 
examples, a nation’s export share can 
be misleading, since a large component 
of the value of exports from countries 
specializing in final processing or 
assembly may reflect imported inputs. 
As an alternative competitiveness 
measure, Timmer, Los, and de Vries 
(2013) use what they call a country’s 
share of the global value chain (GVC) 
income—a country’s share of income 
to capital and labor to meet world 
demand for particular goods and 
services. The data show a substantial 
shift in GVC income from advanced 
countries to emerging economies. In 
1995, advanced economies accounted 
for about three-fourths of the value 
added in the production of manufactured 
goods worldwide; that share had fallen 
to about 50 percent by 2011 (Timmer, 
Los, and de Vries 2013, Figure 3).3 The 
U.S. value-added share for manufactured 
products worldwide fell from 20 percent 
in 1995 to 17 percent in 2009, with 
particularly large declines in textiles, 
leather, wood products, electrical and 
optical equipment, and transportation 
equipment.4 Data from world I-O tables 
also reveal that globally the share of 
income going to capital and high-skilled 
labor has been rising, while that to 
low- and medium-skilled labor has been 
falling (Timmer, Los, and de Vries 2013). 
Trade and American Jobs
Much policy attention in the United 
States has focused on globalization’s 
effects on workers. While many are 
concerned that the rapid growth of 
trade has harmed job growth, the Great 
Recession and weak jobs recovery 
since 2009 has spurred the Obama 
Administration to focus policy efforts on 
increasing exports to boost employment. 
New data from world I-O tables provide 
useful background on how the global 
distribution of jobs has changed and how 
American workers of varying skill levels 
have fared vis-à-vis their counterparts in 
other countries in recent years. 
The indirect foreign labor content 
of U.S. manufactured goods has risen 
substantially since the mid-1990s, 
underscoring the importance of 
accounting for imported intermediates 
in estimating the domestic employment 
effects of export promotion policies. 
Figure 1 displays trends in the U.S. share 
of labor input (in hours) by skill level 
used to meet world demand for all U.S. 
manufactured products, based on data 
from the WIOD. High-skilled workers 
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Figure 1  U.S. Share of Labor Hours Used to Meet Global Demand for U.S. 
Manufactured Products, by Skill Level
in the United States compared to other 
countries or the more rapid expansion of 
demand in emerging economies, which 
might be disproportionately met by local 
production. Moreover, trade is not a zero-
sum game, and a decline in a country’s 
labor share does not necessarily imply 
an absolute decline in the number of 
workers involved in the production of 
manufactured goods. 
In advanced economies, while the 
number of workers in medium- and 
low-skilled jobs associated with 
manufacturing has universally fallen, the 
number in high-skilled jobs generally 
has increased, mitigating those declines. 
The United States is the only exception 
to this pattern (Timmer, Los, and de 
Vries 2013). Despite the large increase 
in global demand for manufactured 
products since 1995, the number of 
Americans in high-skilled jobs associated 
with meeting this demand, along with 
the number in medium- and low-skilled 
jobs, has fallen. Given that the United 
States is presumed to have a comparative 
advantage in high-skilled labor, this 
finding is surprising and suggests that 
college-educated workers in the United 
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NOTE: Labor hours include direct and indirect labor used in the production of manufactured 
products. About half of these labor hours are worked in nonmanufacturing sectors.  
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from the World Input-Output Database.
Figure 2  U.S. Share of Labor Hours Used to Meet Global Demand for All 
Manufactured Products, by Skill Level
NOTE: Labor hours include direct and indirect labor used in the production of manufactured 
products. About half of these labor hours are worked in nonmanufacturing sectors.  

















High -skilled Medium -skilled Low-skilled
refer to those with a college education, 
medium-skilled workers are those with 
a high-school education, and low-skilled 
workers lack a high school degree. 
The U.S. share of direct and indirect 
labor hours used in the production of 
U.S. manufactured goods has fallen 
over time for all skill levels. This trend 
is consistent with the rising share of 
imported intermediates used in U.S. 
manufacturing. Perhaps not surprisingly, 
the U.S. share of low-skilled labor 
embedded in U.S. manufactured products 
is low and has fallen from 33 percent in 
1995 to 23 percent in 2009, reflecting the 
shift in sourcing to developing countries 
for tasks requiring low-skilled labor. 
Because U.S. goods and services are 
inputs in the production of manufactured 
products overseas, it is necessary to 
examine labor shares to meet worldwide 
demand for manufactured products to 
understand how the distribution of jobs 
in the global economy has shifted. Figure 
2 shows that the U.S. share of direct and 
indirect labor hours used in the global 
production of manufactured products has 
fallen, most strikingly for high-skilled 
workers. In 1995 the United States 
accounted for about 17 percent of high-
skilled labor used directly or indirectly 
to meet world demand for manufacturing 
products; by 2009 that share was just 9 
percent. 
One must be cautious in drawing 
conclusions from these descriptive 
statistics. Falling labor shares could 
reflect higher labor productivity growth 
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Notes
The conference, “Measuring Globalization,” 
was cosponsored by the Upjohn Institute and 
the Progressive Policy Institute and funded by 
the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation.
1. Yao, Ma, and Pei (2013) illustrate the
challenges of estimating the import content of 
exports in China’s huge processing sector, and 
Ahmad (2013) describes initiatives be taken 
by OECD to improve the quality of data in 
world I-O tables.
2. This figure is based on the author’s
calculations using the WIOD. 
3. Timmer et al. (2013) focus on
competitiveness measures for manufactured 
products because data on I-O relationships for 
services industries are relatively crude in most 
countries. 
4. Figures are author’s calculations based
on the WIOD.
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This is an excerpt from a forthcoming 
Upjohn Press book, The New Scarlet Letter? 
Negotiating the U.S. Labor Market with a 
Criminal Record, by Steven Raphael. To 
preorder the book, visit www.upjohn.org/
Publications/Titles/TheNewScarletLetter. 
In 2011, nearly 700,000 people
were released from either a state or 
federal prison. These releases added to 
the roughly 6 million adults who have 
served prison time in the past. Many 
will experience a host of difficulties 
upon reentering noninstitutional society. 
Those with minor children (especially 
incarcerated men) often accumulate 
substantial back child-support obligations 
while incarcerated and face the legal 
requirement to pay down the balance. 
Many face precarious housing situations 
and a high risk of homelessness following 
release. Most have little in the way of 
assets and receive a very small amount 
of “gate money” upon release, usually 
no more than a few hundred dollars. 
Many will be returned to custody for 
either parole violations or for a new 
felony offense. In light of these problems 
and the sheer numbers of individuals 
released from our prisons each year, 
policymakers at all levels of government 
are increasingly focused on how to foster 
and support the successful reentry of 
former prison inmates.
For a myriad of reasons, stable 
employment is of central importance to 
the successful reentry of former inmates 
into society. To start, the material well 
being of most released inmates depends 
principally on what they can earn in the 
labor market. The U.S. social safety net 
provides little by way of public assistance 
for the nonworking poor, especially for 
able-bodied and nonelderly men. Thus, 
avoiding material poverty requires gainful 
employment. 
Second, economic research has 
demonstrated that the likelihood of 
committing crime depends to some 
extent on having something to lose. 
Those with good jobs and good 
employment prospects in the legitimate 
labor market tend to commit less crime. 
Those with poor employment prospects 
tend to commit more. Higher criminal 
participation among those with low 
earnings may be driven by the need to 
generate income to meet basic needs, a 
sense that the potential losses associated 
with being caught and punished are low 
when legitimate job opportunities are 
rare, or a general sense of not playing 
a meaningful role outside of prison. 
Regardless of the causal avenue, the 
transition to stable employment is often 
characterized as a key determinant of 
desistance from criminal activity and the 
process of disentangling oneself from the 
criminal justice system.
Third, most released male inmates 
are of an age where they are firmly 
attached to the labor force and 
where conventional norms regarding 
responsible adult behavior prescribe 
steady legitimate work and supporting 
one’s dependents. Facilitating “buy in” 
among former inmates into conventional 
society requires that they be afforded the 
opportunity to transition into the standard 
roles of other law-abiding citizens.
Finally, formal employment provides 
daily structure and a sense of purpose 
for many—factors that may prevent 
further criminal activity. Criminologists 
have studied in-depth the “incapacitation 
effect” of prison—that is, the extent to 
which prisons reduce crime by forcibly 
segregating the criminally active. Of 
course, many other activities incapacitate 
criminal activity, if we interpret the 
Stable employment is of 
central importance to the 
successful reentry of former 
inmates into society.
